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Abstract
We consider a pure exchange economy with nitely many indivisible commodi-
ties that are available only in integer quantities. We prove that in such an economy
with a suciently large number of agents, but nitely many agents, the strong core
coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations. Because of the indi-
visibility, the preference maximization does not imply the cost minimization. A
cost-minimized Walras equilibrium is a state where, under some price vector, all
agents satisfy both the preference maximization and the cost minimization.
Keywords: Indivisible commodities, Strong core, Cost-minimized Walras equilib-
rium, Core equivalence.
JEL Classication: C71, D51.
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1 Introduction
The core is an institution-free concept, but it is known that in an economy with perfectly
divisible commodities, the core contains all Walras allocations and any core allocation
can be approximately decentralized by prices, as the number of agents becomes large.
The purpose of this paper is to prove that, if every commodity is indivisible, then the
core coincides with the set of Walras allocations with a certain property, even though the
number of economic agents is nite. In particular, any core allocation in a large nite
economy can be exactly decentralized by prices.
The perfect divisibility of commodities is usually assumed in economic theory for the
convenience of the analysis. In this paper, we assume that every commodity can be
consumed only in integer quantities. Agents can consume multiple types of commodities
and can consume multiple units of each commodity. Thus, the commodity space is given
by the products of the set of integers. Our argument shows that the inherent properties
of the set of integers such as countability, discreteness, and additivity are helpful, rather
than obstructive, to prove the core equivalence.
In our economy, because of the discreteness of the commodity space, agents' preference
relations are necessarily locally satiated. Thus, the preference maximization does not
imply the cost minimization. On the other hand, since any consumption vector cannot
have local cheaper consumption vector under any prices, the cost minimization does not
imply the preference maximization. Thus, approximate equilibrium in an economy with
perfectly divisible commodities such as pseudo-equilibrium or quasi-equilibrium is not an
approximate concept in our economy. Therefore, a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium
which satises not only the preference maximization but also the cost minimization is a
stronger concept than a Walras equilibrium. In our economy, the set of cost-minimized
Walras allocations coincides with the core.
In the literature, several notions of improvement by a coalition are used to dene
cores. In an economy with indivisible commodities, the size of the core depends heavily
on which notion of improvement is adopted. Accordingly, a clear distinction among the
several competing notions of cores should be made. The core we focus on is dened by the
weak improvement. The weak improvement requires that some members in a coalition to
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be better o and other members not be worse o by redistribution of their endowments.
This is the same core that Debreu and Scarf [5] analyzed. We refer to this notion of the
core as the strong core.
Debreu and Scarf [5] considered a sequence of replica economies with convex consump-
tion sets. Two agents who have the same preference relation and the same endowment
vector are said to be of the same type. An economy where in each type there are n times as
many agents as the original economy is called the n-fold replica economy. If agents' pref-
erence relations are strongly convex, then agents of the same type are allocated the same
consumption bundle by a strong core allocation or by a Walras allocation in any replica
economy. (We refer to this property of strong core allocations as the strong equal treat-
ment property.) Thus, by choosing a representative agent from each type, we can regard
strong core allocations and Walras allocations for any replica economy as having the same
dimensions as allocations for the original economy. Therefore, we can compare the size of
strong cores or the size of Walras allocations of economies with a dierent number of repli-
cations. Although the size of Walras allocations is constant, the sequence of strong cores
is shrinking as the number of replications increases, because possible coalitions increase.
Under the assumptions of strong convexity and local nonsatiation of preference relations,
Debreu and Scarf [5] proved that the limit of the decreasing sequence of strong cores coin-
cides with the set of Walras allocations. By the local nonsatiation, Walras equilibria are
cost-minimized Walras equilibria and, therefore, Debreu and Scarf's result implies that
the limit of the sequence of strong cores coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras
allocations. Our main theorem gives the same core equivalence in a nite economy with
indivisible commodities.
Anderson [1] used the notion of a core dened by strong improvement that requires
all members in a coalition to be better o by redistribution of their endowments. We
refer to this as the weak core. Without any assumptions, Walras allocations are always
in the weak core. Anderson [1] considered a more general sequence of economies than the
sequence of replica economies. In Anderson's model, all agents may belong to dierent
types, and agents' preference relations need not be convex. Anderson [1] proved that under
the assumption of monotonicity of preference relations (a stronger assumption than local
nonsatiation), if the number of agents whose endowment vectors are in a given bounded
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set increases, then some measure of the non-Walras degree of weak core allocations tends
to zero. Therefore, in a large nite economy, weak core allocations can be approximately
decentralized by prices.
Both in Debreu and Scarf's [5] theorem and in Anderson's [1] theorem, the assump-
tions of the local nonsatiation of preference relations and the convexity of consumption
sets play essential roles. Strictly speaking, Anderson's [1] measure of the non-Walras
degree represents the distance between weak core allocation and quasi-equilibrium. In
an economy with convex consumption sets, if agents' endowment vectors lie in the inte-
rior of their consumption sets, then so-called \minimum wealth condition" is met and,
hence, quasi-equilibrium is Walras equilibrium. In our economy, in contrast, as mentioned
earlier, quasi-equilibrium is not necessarily close to Walras equilibrium; therefore, even
if we can show that Anderson's measure tends to zero, we cannot say that the strong
core is close to the set of Walras allocations. Accordingly, we consider a more restrictive
economy than that investigated by Anderson [1], but our economy is still more general
than replica economy investigated by Debreu and Scarf [5]. We can prove that, if the
number of agents' types is nite and if each type has many agents, then the strong core
coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations. It should be noted that our
economy does not have properties essential in theorems by Debreu and Scarf [5] and by
Anderson [1] and, in contrast to Debreu and Scarf's [5] theorem, our theorem is not a
\limit theorem."
In our economy, because of indivisibility, the strong core and the set of cost-minimized
Walras allocations can be empty. Thus, the equivalence may be vacuous. To guarantee the
nonemptiness of the strong core or the existence of a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium,
some combinatorial conditions are needed. First, the type set is important. There exists
an economy which does not have a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium regardless of the
number of agents of each type. Example 3 illustrates this fact. Second, the relative ratio
of the number of agents of each type to the size of economy is important. In Example 2,
we give an economy with two types s and t. If the number of agents of type s is smaller
than the number of agents of type t, a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium always exists.
On the other hand, if the number of agents of type s is larger than the number of agents of
type t, then a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium does not exist unless these two numbers
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are in a certain ratio.
In the process of the proof of our core equivalence theorem, the weak equal treatment
property of strong core allocations is shown. That is, consumption bundles allocated
by a strong core allocation to agents of the same type have the same utility level with
respect to the common preference relation. As discussed earlier, in an economy with
convex consumption sets and strongly convex preference relations, strong core allocations
have the strong equal treatment property: all members of the same type receive the
same consumption bundle. This property depends heavily on the strong convexity of
preference relations. In addition, as Green [7] pointed out, this property is inherent to
replica economies. Green [7] proved that for almost all economies where the greatest
common divisor of the numbers of agents of each type is one, there exists a strong core
allocation that does not even have the weak equal treatment property. It should be
emphasized that the method of proof of our equal treatment property is very dierent
from that provided by Debreu and Scarf [5]. Moreover, our equal treatment property
holds even if the greatest common divisor of the numbers of agents of each type is one.
In other work, Inoue [11] obtained the same core equivalence in an atomless economy
under weaker assumptions on agents' preference relations. In our theorem, we assume
that any two commodities are substitutable, whereas in Inoue's [11] theorem, lexico-
graphic preference relations are permitted. In our theorem, we give a bound of the size
of economies above which the core equivalence holds. To clarify such bound, we need
stronger assumptions and lengthier argument than Inoue's [11] proof in which Lyapunov's
convexity theorem can be applied.
Inoue [9] obtained another type of core equivalence in an atomless economy. He
introduced a core dened by improvement as an intermediate notion between the weak
and the strong improvement. Accordingly, such a core is also an intermediate concept
between the strong and the weak core. We denote this as the core. Inoue [9] proved
that the core coincides with the set of exactly feasible Walras allocations. Our theorem
and Inoue's [11] theorem imply that large nite economy and atomless economy produce
the same equivalence on the strong core. On the core, in contrast, the equivalence holds
only in atomless economies. Actually, Inoue [12] gave examples of the sequence of replica
economies such that every economy has a core allocation which is not a Walras allocation;
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therefore, the set of exactly feasible Walras allocations is strictly smaller than the core in
any replica economy and only in the limit, both sets coincide.
Shapley and Scarf [15] analyzed yet another type of indivisible commodity market.
Their economic model has nitely many agents, and each agent has only one indivisible
commodity (e.g., a house). Commodities are also dierentiated; therefore, the number of
agents is equal to the number of commodities. In their model, it is assumed that every
agent prefers his commodity to nothing. Hence, any individually rational feasible alloca-
tion can be represented by a permutation of the initial allocation. By using David Gale's
top-trading-cycle method, Shapley and Scarf proved that Walras equilibria always exist,
even though the strong core can be empty. Subsequently, Roth and Postlewaite [14] proved
that, if agents' preference relations do not admit indierence among consumptions of one
unit of one commodity, then the strong core coincides with the set of Walras allocations
(which are also cost-minimized Walras allocations by the no-indierence assumption) and
these sets consist of only one allocation; therefore, the same core equivalence holds as ours
and also it is not a vacuous equivalence. Wako [17] proved that, even if agents' prefer-
ence relations have indierence, the strong core coincides with the set of cost-minimized
Walras allocations, although these sets are possibly empty. This is an improvement of his
previous work (Wako [16]), where he proved that any strong core allocation is a Walras
allocation. These results in the Shapley-Scarf model can be easily extended to replica
economies so that our assumption that the number of agents of each type is large can
be satised. Roth and Postlewaite's [14] and Wako's [17] proofs depend heavily on the
model specication, so theirs are very dierent from the proof in this paper. In addition,
their core equivalence holds in any replica economy, whereas our core equivalence holds
only in a suciently large economy which is not necessarily a replica economy.
The paper itself is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model and the
main theorem. Section 3 provides an outline of the proof of the theorem. Section 4 gives a
formal proof. Purely technical results used in the proof of the main theorem are relegated
to the Appendix.
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2 Model and Main Theorem
We begin with some notation. Let R; Q, and Z be the sets of real numbers, rational
numbers, and integers, respectively. For x = (x(1); : : : ; x(m)) and y = (y(1); : : : ; y(m)) in
Rm (m  2), we write x  y if x(j)  y(j) for all j 2 f1; : : : ;mg; x > y if x  y and
x 6= y; x y if x(j) > y(j) for all j 2 f1; : : : ;mg. The symbol 0 denotes the origin in Rm,
as well as the real number zero. Let i be the ith unit vector, i.e., 
(i)
i = 1 and 
(j)
i = 0
if j 6= i. Rm+ = fx 2 Rm jx  0g; Rm++ = fx 2 Rm jx  0g. Qm+ and Zm+ are dened in a
similar way. Z++ is the set of natural numbers. The inner product
Pm
j=1 x
(j)y(j) of x and
y in Rm is denoted by x  y. The cardinality of a nite set A is denoted by #A.
We consider a pure exchange economy with L indivisible commodities, where L is a
natural number with L  2.1 Every commodity in our economy is available in integer
quantities; therefore, the commodity space is given by ZL. For simplicity, we assume that
all agents have the same consumption set ZL+. An agent a is characterized by his preference
relation -a on ZL+ and his endowment vector e(a) 2 ZL+. Any preference relation - is a
binary relation on ZL+ which is required to be reexive, transitive, complete, and weakly
monotone.2 Let P be the set of all preference relations on ZL+. Given a preference relation
-, we dene binary relations  and  as follows: x  y if and only if not (x - y); x  y
if and only if x - y and y - x. We sometimes write x % y for y - x and write x  y for
y  x.
The space of agents' characteristics is then P  ZL+. A mapping E of a nite set A
of agents into P  ZL+, E(a) = (-a; e(a)) for all a 2 A, is an economy if
P
a2A e(a)  0.
Given an economy E : A ! P  ZL+, an allocation for E is a mapping of A into ZL+. An
allocation f : A ! ZL+ for E is exactly feasible if the equality
P
a2A f(a) =
P
a2A e(a)
holds. A coalition is a nonempty subset of A.
The core we focus on is the strong core dened by the weak improvement. The precise
denition is as follows:
1For an economy with only one commodity, we can easily show that, if every agent's preference relation
is strongly monotone, then the strong core coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations,
and these sets contain only endowment allocation.
2A preference relation - is weakly monotone if, for all x and y in ZL+, x  y implies that x - y.
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Denition 1. Let f : A ! ZL+ be an allocation for an economy E : A ! P  ZL+. A
coalition S can weakly improve upon f if there exists a mapping g : S ! ZL+ such thatX
a2S
g(a) =
X
a2S
e(a);
g(a) a f(a) for some a 2 S, and
g(a) %a f(a) for all a 2 S:
The set of all exactly feasible allocations for E that cannot be weakly improved upon by
any coalition is called the strong core of E and is denoted by CS(E).
Obviously, every strong core allocation is then Pareto-ecient. If there exist only
two agents in an economy, strong core allocation is equal to individually rational Pareto-
ecient allocation; therefore, there always exists a strong core allocation. If the size of
an economy is larger than two agents, then, in contrast, the strong core can be empty. In
Example 3 below, we give an economy with the empty strong core.
In our economy, the strong core is completely characterized by cost-minimized Walras
equilibria whose denition is as follows:
Denition 2. Let E : A ! P  ZL+ be an economy. A pair (p; f) of a price vector
p 2 QL+ and an exactly feasible allocation f : A ! ZL+ is called a cost-minimized Walras
equilibrium for E if
(i) for all a 2 A, p  f(a)  p  e(a);
(ii) for all a 2 A, if x 2 ZL+ and x a f(a), then p  x > p  e(a); and
(iii) for all a 2 A, if x 2 ZL+ and x %a f(a), then p  x  p  e(a).
An exactly feasible allocation f : A ! ZL+ is called a cost-minimized Walras allocation
for E if there exists a price vector p 2 QL+ such that (p; f) is a cost-minimized Walras
equilibrium for E . The set of all cost-minimized Walras allocations for E is denoted by
WCM(E).
From the exact feasibility of f and condition (i), it follows that p f(a) = p e(a) for all
a 2 A.3 Putting together this with condition (ii), we obtain the preference maximization:
3This follows also from the exact feasibility of f and condition (iii), or from conditions (i) and (iii).
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for all a 2 A, f(a) %a x holds for all x 2 fy 2 ZL+ j p  y  p  f(a)g. Also, putting together
with condition (iii), we obtain the cost minimization: for all a 2 A, p  f(a)  p  x holds
for all x 2 fy 2 ZL+ j y %a f(a)g.
When a pair (p; f) of a price vector p 2 QL+ and an exactly feasible allocation f satises
conditions (i) and (ii), it is called a Walras equilibrium. We denote the set of all Walras
allocations for E by W (E). Note that, because of indivisibility, even a Walras equilibrium
may not exist.4
In an economy with perfectly divisible commodities, if agents' preference relations
are locally nonsatiated, then the preference maximization implies the cost minimization;
therefore, Walras equilibrium is cost-minimized Walras equilibrium. On the other hand,
if agents' consumption sets are convex, preference relations are continuous, and the min-
imum wealth condition is met, then the cost minimization implies the preference maxi-
mization (see Debreu [4, Theorem (1), Section 9, Chapter 4]); therefore, if (p; f) satises
conditions (i) and (iii), then it also satises condition (ii). In our economy, in contrast,
since the commodity space is discrete, one of the preference maximization and the cost
minimization does not imply the other. Thus, there can exists a Walras equilibrium that
is not a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium. Actually, in Examples 1 and 3 below, we give
an economy with a Walras equilibrium that is not a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium.
If (p; f) is a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium, then for all  2 Q++, ( p; f) is also
a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium. Thus, for every cost-minimized Walras allocation,
there exists an associated integral equilibrium price vector. It should be noted that we
can restrict the space of price vectors to QL+ without loss of generality. In fact, if a pair
of a vector p 2 RL+ nQL+ and an exactly feasible allocation f satises conditions (i)-(iii) of
Denition 2, then there exists a price vector p 2 QL+ such that (p; f) is a cost-minimized
Walras equilibrium.5
By an argument similar to the proof of the rst welfare theorem, we can show that,
for all economy E , cost-minimized Walras allocations for E are strong core allocations for
4Henry [8] gave an example of an economy with one indivisible commodity and two divisible commodi-
ties such that a Walras equilibrium does not exist. For economies where every commodity is indivisible,
Shapley and Scarf [15, Section 8] gave an example of the nonexistence of a Walras equilibrium.
5This fact is clear from the last part of the proof of our main theorem.
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E , i.e., WCM(E)  CS(E).
In our main theorem, we place restrictions on preference relations. For all k 2 Z with
k  2,6 we dene a subset Pk of P as follows: -2 Pk if and only if (i) -2 P and (ii) for
all h; i 2 f1; : : : ; Lg with h 6= i and all x 2 ZL+, if x(i)  1, then x+ k h  i  x.7 From
(i) and (ii), it follows that, for all h 2 f1; : : : ; Lg and all x 2 ZL+, x + k h  x holds.8
Condition (ii) means that agents whose preference relations are in Pk are willing to give
up one unit of a commodity in exchange for k units of another commodity. Therefore,
preference relations in Pk have uniformly positive marginal rates of substitution. In
particular, the lexicographic ordering is excluded.
In our main theorem, we consider an economy where there exist many agents who
have the same preference relation and the same endowment vector. To make this more
precise, we introduce some notation. Let k 2 Z with k  2 and let T  Pk  ZL+ be a
nonempty nite set. The set T is a type set of agents. For all t 2 T , we write t = (-t; et).
Given an economy E : A! T and a type t 2 T , denote the set of agents of type t by At,
i.e., At = E 1(ftg) = fa 2 A j (-a; e(a)) = tg.
We rst give r 2 R with r  1, k 2 Z with k  2, and T  PkZL+. Then, we consider
an economy E : A! T such that (1) #A is suciently large and (2) #At=#A  1=r for all
t 2 T . Thus, the number 1=r represents a lower bound of the ratio of agents of each type
t to the whole economy. Conditions (1) and (2) guarantee that there exist many agents
whose types are t, i.e., #At is large enough. If number r and economy E : A! T satisfy
that r = #T and #At=#A  1=r for all t 2 T , this economy is the #A=r-fold replica
economy. Hence, our theorem covers more general economies than replica economies.
We can now state our main result.
6The reason why k is assumed to be greater than 1 is that P1, which is dened similar to Pk with
k  2, is empty. Indeed, if -2 P1, then 1 = 2+1 2  2 and 2 = 1+2 1  1, contradicting
the irreexivity of . This fact was pointed out by Akiyoshi Shioura.
7Condition (ii) is related to the equi-monotonicity of preference relations in an economy with perfectly
divisible commodities. Let Q be the space of continuous and strongly monotone preference relations on
the consumption set RL+. It can be shown that for every nite subset Q0 of Q and every compact subset
K of RL++, there exists a positive number  such that, for all -2 Q0, all h; i 2 f1; : : : ; Lg, and all x 2 K,
x+ h    i  x holds.
8This fact can be shown as follows. Let i 6= h. Then, x+ k h = (x+ i) + k h   i  x+ i % x.
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Theorem. For all r 2 R with r  1, all k 2 Z with k  2, and all T  Pk  ZL+ with
#T  r and Pt2T et  0, there exists an N 2 Z++ such that if E : A ! T; #A  N ,
and #At=#A  1=r for all t 2 T , then
(1) all strong core allocations for E have the weak equal treatment property, i.e., for all
f 2 CS(E), all t 2 T , and all a; b 2 At, f(a) a f(b) holds; and
(2) the strong core of E coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations for
E, i.e., CS(E) =WCM(E).
The number N depends on r; k; L, and M = maxfkek1 j (-; e) 2 Tg.9 The proof of
the theorem is given in Section 4. From the proof, it is clear that the size of economies
which satisfy the weak equal treatment property of strong core allocations is smaller than
the size of economies which also satisfy the equivalence between the strong core and the
set of cost-minimized Walras allocations.
Since the inclusion WCM(E)  CS(E) holds for any economy E , our theorem says the
converse holds if the size of economy is suciently large. A small economy E1 can have
a strong core allocation f1 that is not a cost-minimized Walras allocation. In any replica
economy En of E1, the replica allocation of f1 is not a cost-minimized Walras allocation
for En. From our theorem, if the number n of replications is suciently large, then the
replica allocation of f1 is not a strong core allocation for replica economy En. The next
example illustrates this fact.
Example 1. Let L = 2 and T = fs; tg. Each type's endowment vector is given by
es = (3; 1) and et = (2; 2). Each type's preference relation is represented by the following
utility functions (see Figures 1 and 2):
us(x
(1); x(2)) =
8<: 2x(1) + x(2) if x(1)  1,1
2
(x(1) + 2x(2) + 3) if x(1)  2, and
ut(x
(1); x(2)) = x(1) + x(2):
Clearly, both -s and -t are in P3.
For all n  1, let An;s = f(s; 1); : : : ; (s; n)g, An;t = f(t; 1); : : : ; (t; n)g, and An =
An;s [An;t. For all n  1, dene economy En : An ! T by En(s; i) = s and En(t; i) = t for
9For x 2 RL, kxk1 = maxfjx(j)j j j = 1; : : : ; Lg.
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commodity 1
commodity 2
0
es
Figure 1: Endowment vector and indierence curves of agents of type s
commodity 1
commodity 2
0
et
Figure 2: Endowment vector and indierence curves of agents of type t
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all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Thus, economy En is the n-fold replica economy of E1, and economy
En consists of n agents of type s and n agents of type t. An allocation f1 : A1 ! Z2+ for
E1 is dened by f1(s; 1) = (1; 2) and f1(t; 1) = (4; 1). One could check that f1 2 CS(E1)
and f1 62 WCM(E1).
For all n  2, let fn : An ! Z2+ be a replica allocation of f1; that is, fn(s; i) = f1(s; 1)
and fn(t; i) = f1(t; 1) for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. For all n  2, fn is not a cost-minimized
Walras allocation for En for the same reason that f1 62 WCM(E1). Although f1 is a strong
core allocation for E1, for all n  2, fn is not a strong core allocation for En as we show
in the following.
Let n  2. Consider S = f(s; 1); (s; 2); (t; 1)g. Dene g : S ! Z2+ by
g(s; i) = f1(s; 1) = (1; 2) for i = 1; 2, and
g(t; 1) = (6; 0):
Then, X
(r;i)2S
g(r; i) =
X
(r;i)2S
en(r; i) and g(t; 1) t f1(t; 1);
where en : An ! Z2+ is the endowment allocation for En. Therefore, fn 62 CS(En) for all
n  2.
From our theorem, it follows that there exists an n0 2 Z++ such that, for all n  n0,
CS(En) = WCM(En) holds. In this example, we can choose n0 = 2. It can be shown that,
for all n  2,
CS(En) =
8<:f : An ! Z2+
 f(s; i) = (1; 3) and f(t; i) = (4; 0)for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
9=; :
Thus, for all n  2, every allocation in CS(En) is a cost-minimized Walras allocation under
the price vector (1; 1). Hence, for all n  2, ; 6= CS(En) = WCM(En).
Note that, for all n  1, endowment allocation en is a Walras allocation under the
price vector p = (1; p(2)) with 1 < p(2) < 3=2, but en is not a cost-minimized Walras
allocation. Summing up these facts, for all n  2, ; 6= CS(En) = WCM(En) ( W (En)
holds.
The next example illustrates that combinatorial condition on the relative ratios #At=#A
(t 2 T ) is needed for the existence of cost-minimized Walras equilibrium.
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Example 2. Consider the type set T form Example 1. In Example 1, we considered
economies where the number of agents of type s is equal to the number of agents of
type t. Here, we consider economies where these two numbers are dierent. By an
argument similar to Example 1, we can show that, if economy E : A ! T satises that
0 < #As=#A  #At=#A, then any feasible allocation f : A! Z2+ such that
f(a) = (1; 3) for all a 2 As, and
kf(a)k1 = 4 for all a 2 At
is a cost-minimized Walras allocation for E .10
We consider economy E : A ! T with #As=#A > #At=#A > 0. If #As=#A = 2=3
and #At=#A = 1=3, then allocation f : A! Z2+ dened by
f(a) =
8<: (1; 2) if a 2 As;(6; 0) if a 2 At;
is exactly feasible. In addition, f is a cost-minimized Walras allocation under p = (1; 2).
If economy E : A ! T satises that #As=#A > #At=#A > 0 and #As=#A 6= 2=3,
then E does not have a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium as shown in the following.
 Under price vector p = (1; p(2)) with p(2) < 1, commodity 2 is in excess demand.
 Under price vector p = (1; p(2)) with p(2) > 2, commodity 1 is in excess demand.
 Under price vector p = (1; p(2)) with 1 < p(2) < 2, agents of type s do not have
consumption vectors that satisfy both the preference maximization and the cost
minimization.
 Under price vector p = (1; p(2)) with p(2) = 1 or p(2) = 2, preference-maximized
allocations are not feasible.
Summing up these results, we have
 If economy E : A! T satises that 0 < #As=#A  #At=#A, then WCM(E) 6= ;.
10For x 2 RL, kxk1 =
PL
i=1 jx(i)j.
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 If economy E : A ! T satises that #As=#A = 2=3 and #At=#A = 1=3, then
WCM(E) 6= ;.
 If economy E : A! T satises that #As=#A > #At=#A > 0 and #As=#A 6= 2=3,
then WCM(E) = ;.
Hence, in order to guarantee the existence of cost-minimized Walras equilibrium, the
relative ratio of the number of agents of each type to the size of economy is essential.
From our theorem, this relative ratio is essential also for the nonemptiness of the strong
core.
Not only the relative ratios #At=#A (t 2 T ) but also the type set T is essential for
the existence of a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium. The next example illustrates this
fact.
Example 3. Let L = 2 and T = ftg. Type t's endowment vector et is given by (1; 2). The
preference relation -t of agents of type t is represented by a utility function ut : Z2+ ! R
dened by
ut(x
(1); x(2)) =
8<: 3:5 if (x(1); x(2)) = (3; 0);x(1) + x(2) otherwise.
(See Figure 3.) Then, -t2 P2. Although the indierence curves drawn in the gure are
not convex, this preference relation is discretely convex in the sense that, for all x 2 Z2+,
we have co
 fy 2 Z2+ j y %t xg\Z2 = fy 2 Z2+ j y %t xg, where co(C) denotes the convex
hull of set C.11 For all n  1, let An = f(t; 1); : : : ; (t; n)g. Dene En : An ! T by
En(t; i) = t for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Let en : An ! Z2+ be the endowment allocation for En.
In every economy En with n  1, if price vector p = (1; p(2)) satises that p(2)  1=2,
then commodity 2 is in excess demand; if p = (1; p(2)) satises that p(2)  1, then
commodity 1 is in excess demand. Under price vector p = (1; p(2)) with 1=2 < p(2) < 1,
a pair (p; en) is a Walras equilibrium, but is not a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium.
Since any other allocation than en cannot be a Walras allocation under p = (1; p
(2)) with
1=2 < p(2) < 1, we have ; = WCM(En) ( W (En) = feng for all n  1.
11The discrete convexity of preference relation is related to the nonemptiness of the weak core. See
Inoue [10].
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commodity 1
commodity 2
0
et
Figure 3: Endowment vector and indierence curves of agents of type t
From our theorem, it follows that CS(En) = ; = WCM(En) for n large enough. Indeed,
this equivalence is met for all n  4; one can show that CS(En) = ; for all n  4. On the
other hand, if 2  n  3, there exists a strong core allocation that is not a cost-minimized
Walras allocation. Actually, endowment allocation e2 for E2 is a strong core allocation,
but as mentioned above, e2 is not a cost-minimized Walras allocation. Also, an allocation
g : f(t; 1); (t; 2); (t; 3)g ! Z2+ for E3 dened by
g(t; 1) = (3; 0); and
g(t; i) = (0; 3) for all i 2 f2; 3g
is a strong core allocation but is not a Walras allocation for E3.
3 Outline of the Proof
We give an outline of the proof here and give a formal proof in the next section. Let
r 2 R with r  1, k 2 Z with k  2, and T  Pk  ZL+ with #T  r and
P
t2T et  0.
Let E : A! T be an economy with #At=#A  1=r for all t 2 T . Later we assume that
#A is suciently large, but at this point A may be an arbitrary nite set of agents.
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In Lemma 1, we prove that strong core allocations are uniformly bounded; there
exists a  2 Z+ such that kf(a)k1   for all f 2 CS(E) and all a 2 A. It should be
emphasized that the upper bound  depends only on exogenous variables r, k, L, and
M = maxfkek1 j (-; e) 2 Tg, and it does not depend on the size #A of economy. Since
T is a nite set, agents' net trade vectors are also uniformly bounded; kf(a) e(a)k1  
for all f 2 CS(E) and all a 2 A. (From the denition of  which is made precise in the
formal proof, we can take the same upper bound as the one of strong core allocations.)
Let XL; = fx 2 ZL j kxk1  g. Then, for all f 2 CS(E) and all a 2 A, f(a)  
e(a) 2 XL;. Since XL; is a nite set and every strong core allocation f is exactly
feasible, i.e.,
P
a2A(f(a)  e(a)) = 0, we can expect that, if #A is suciently large, then
there exists a nonempty subset B of A such that f is exactly feasible within B, i.e.,P
a2B(f(a)  e(a)) = 0. This expectation is true as proved in Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
We can take a subset B whose cardinality is bounded by (L; ). Literally, this upper
bound depends only on dimension L and the upper bound  of vectors f(a) e(a) (a 2 A).
After these preparations, we can show that all strong core allocations have the weak
equal treatment property; if #A > r(L; ), then, for all f 2 CS(E), all t 2 T , and all
a; b 2 At, f(a) t f(b) holds (Lemma 2). This is proved by a contradiction argument.
 Strong core allocation f is exactly feasible withinB and withinAnB, i.e.,Pa2B(f(a) 
e(a)) = 0 and
P
a2AnB(f(a)  e(a)) = 0.
 If B \ At 6= ; for some t 2 T , then (A n B) \ At 6= ;. (This follows from the
assumption #A > r(L; ).)
These facts play essential roles to construct a coalition which can weakly improve upon
f .
Assume that #A is suciently large. (The required size of economy is made precise
in the formal proof.) Let f 2 CS(E). For every t 2 T , let
 t = fx 2 ZL+ j x %t f(a)g   fetg;
where a 2 At. By the weak equal treatment property,  t is well-dened. A cost-minimized
Walras equilibrium price vector can be obtained in two steps. First, we nd a price vector
p0 under which strong core allocation f satises the cost minimization. Second, we move
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p0 slightly and nd a price vector p under which f satises both the cost minimization
and the preference maximization. In both steps, we use a well-known separation theorem
for convex sets. To obtain price vector p0, it suces to prove that
0 62 int
 
co
 [
t2T
 t
!!
;
where int(C) denotes the interior of set C. This is proved by a contradiction argument.
Thus, we suppose that 0 2 int  co  St2t  t and we nd a coalition which can weakly
improve upon f . From 0 2 int  co  St2t  t, 0 can be represented as a convex combi-
nation of elements of
S
t2T  t. Roughly speaking, the denomination of coecients of the
convex combination represents the size of improving coalition. Thus, we have to nd a
convex combination whose coecients are rational and their denominators are bounded.
To obtain such convex combination, we need a mathematical lemma (Lemma 6 in the
Appendix). The size #A of economy E must be larger than these denominators.
Assume that we could prove that 0 62 int  co  St2t  t. Then, by the separation
theorem for convex sets, there exists a p0 2 RLnf0g such that p0 z  0 for all z 2
S
t2T  t.
Under price vector p0, f satises the cost minimization, but there may exist an x 2 ZL+
such that x a f(a) and p0  (x   e(a)) = 0 for some a 2 A. In such a case, we
put H0 = fz 2 RL j p0  z = 0g and, by the same argument as above, we prove that
0 62 ri  co  St2T  t \H0, where ri(C) denotes the relative interior of set C. Again, by
the separation theorem for convex sets, there exists a p1 2 span
 S
t2T  t \H0
nf0g such
that p1  z  0 for all z 2
S
t2T  t \ H0. If we take suciently small "1 > 0, then, for
all z 2 St2T  t with p0  z > 0, (p0 + "1 p1)  z > 0 holds and, for all z 2 St2T  t \ H0,
(p0 + "1 p1)  z  0 holds. Namely, if x 2 ZL+ is outside the budget set under p0, then
x is still outside the new budget set under p0 + "1 p1. This is possible because agents'
consumption set ZL+ is discrete. When there exists an x 2 ZL+ such that x a f(a) and
(p0 + "1 p1)  (x   e(a)) = 0 for some a 2 A, by repeating the same argument, we can
obtain a price vector p such that, for all a 2 A,
 if x 2 ZL+ and x a f(a), then p  (x  e(a)) > 0, and
 if x 2 ZL+ and x %a f(a), then p  (x  e(a))  0.
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(Note that the dimension of span
 S
t2T  t \H0

is one less than the dimension of span
 S
t2T  t

.
Since the dimension decreases by one at each step, we can obtain p in nite steps.) The pair
(p; f) satises the conditions of cost-minimized Walras equilibrium except that p 2 QL+.
Finally, by applying Inoue's [9] separation theorem (Lemma 7 in the Appendix), we obtain
an integral price vector p under which f is a cost-minimized Walras allocation.
4 Proof of Theorem
Let r 2 R with r  1, k 2 Z with k  2, and T  PkZL+ with #T  r and
P
t2T et  0.
Let
M = maxfkek1 j (-; e) 2 Tg and
 = maxfrM2L2(ML+ 1); (kL+ 1)MLg:
Note that the number  depends only on exogenous variables. We will prove that
strong core allocations are uniformly bounded regardless of the size of economy. In the
case of perfectly divisible commodities, Bewley [3, Theorem 1] rst proved that strong
core allocations are uniformly bounded. His proof uses a contradiction argument, so the
bound of strong core allocations is not clear. On the other hand, Mas-Colell's [13, Lemma
7.4.10] proof claries the bound. Our proof is based on Mas-Colell's proof.
Lemma 1. For every nite set A of agents, if economy E : A ! T satises that
#At=#A  1=r for all t 2 T , then kf(a)k1   for all f 2 CS(E) and all a 2 A.
Proof. Let A be the set of agents and E : A! T be an economy such that #At=#A  1=r
for all t 2 T . Let f 2 CS(E). By a simple calculation, it follows that, if #A  rML2(ML+
1), then kf(a)k1   for all a 2 A. Therefore, in the remainder of the proof, we assume
that #A > rML2(ML+1). Let J = fj 2 f1; : : : ; Lg j f (j)(a) ML+1 for some a 2 Ag
and J 0 = fj 2 f1; : : : ; Lg j f (j)(a)  (kL+1)ML for some a 2 Ag. Then, J 0  J . If J = ;,
the proof has been completed. Thus, the set J is supposed to be nonempty. For j 2 J , we
choose aj 2 argmaxff (j)(a) j a 2 Ag. Note that ai = aj may hold for some distinct indices
i and j. Let B = faj j j 2 Jg. Then, #B  #J  L. The excess demand of the coalition
B is denoted by y =
P
a2B(f(a)  e(a)) 2 ZL. Let J 00 = fj 2 f1; : : : ; Lg j y(j)   1g. By
a simple calculation, y(j)  1 for all j 2 J . Thus, J \ J 00 = ;. We also have:
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(1) y(j)  kML2 for all j 2 J 0.
In addition, if J 0 = ;, then kf(a)k1   for all a 2 A. Therefore, the proof is
completed if we can prove that J 0 = ;.
Claim 1. J 0 = ;.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that J 0 6= ;. Let C = A n B. Then, #C = #A #B 
#A  L. Since #A > rML2(ML+ 1) > L, we have C 6= ;. Dene ~y 2 ZL by
~y = y  
X
j2J 00
y(j)j:
Clearly, ~y  0. Moreover, from (1), it follows that, for all j 2 J 0, ~y(j) = y(j)  kML2.
Subclaim 1.1. J 00 6= ;.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that J 00 = ;. We have
kML2
P
j2J 0 j  ~y = y
=
P
a2B(f(a)  e(a))
=  Pa2C(f(a)  e(a))
=
P
a2C(e(a)  f(a)):
The third equality follows from the exact feasibility of strong core allocation f . Since
C 6= ;, we can choose an agent a of C. Dene a mapping g : C ! ZL+ by
g(a) =
8<: f(a) +
P
c2C(e(c)  f(c)) if a = a;
f(a) if a 2 C n fag:
Because g(a)  f(a) + kj for all j 2 J 0 and -a2 Pk, we have g(a) a f(a). We
also have X
a2C
g(a) =
X
a2C
f(a) +
X
c2C
(e(c)  f(c)) =
X
a2C
e(a):
This contradicts that f 2 CS(E). Thus, we have established the proof of Subclaim 1.1.
For all j 2 J 00, let Cj = fa 2 C j f (j)(a)  1g.
Subclaim 1.2. #Cj > ML
2 for all j 2 J 00.
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Proof. Let j 2 J 00. Since J \ J 00 = ;, it follows that j 62 J . Thus, f (j)(a)  ML for all
a 2 A. Since C n Cj = fa 2 C j f (j)(a) < 1g = fa 2 C j f (j)(a) = 0g, we haveX
a2A
f (j)(a)  f#A  (#C  #Cj)gML
= (#Cj)ML+ (#A #C)ML
 (#Cj)ML+ML2:
On the other hand, since
P
t2T et  0, there exists a type tj 2 T such that e(j)tj  1.
Thus,
#A
r
 #Atj 
X
a2Atj
e(j)(a) 
X
a2A
e(j)(a):
Because strong core allocation f is exactly feasible, we have
#A
r

X
a2A
e(j)(a) =
X
a2A
f (j)(a)  (#Cj)ML+ML2:
Thus,
#Cj  #A
rML
  L > rML
2(ML+ 1)
rML
  L =ML2:
This completes the proof of Subclaim 1.2.
For all j 2 J 00, we have
 1  y(j) = Pa2B(f (j)(a)  e(j)(a))
  Pa2B e(j)(a)
  M(#B)
  ML:
Therefore, by Subclaim 1.2, there exists fGj j j 2 J 00g such that
Gj  Cj for all j 2 J 00;
#Gj =  y(j) for all j 2 J 00, and
Gj \G` = ; if j 6= `:
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Since J 0 6= ;, by (1), there exists an h 2 f1; : : : ; Lg such that ~y(h) = y(h)  kML2. Dene
a mapping g^ : C ! ZL by
g^(a) =
8<: f(a) + kh   j if a 2 Gj (j 2 J 00);f(a) if a 2 C nSj2J 00 Gj:
For all a 2 Gj, f (j)(a)  1 holds since Gj  Cj. Thus, g^(a) 2 ZL+ for all a 2 C. Because
-a 2 Pk for all a 2 C, we have g^(a) a f(a) for all a 2
S
j2J 00 Gj. We also haveX
a2C
g^(a) =
X
a2C
f(a) + k
X
j2J 00
(#Gj)h  
X
j2J 00
(#Gj)j
=
X
a2C
f(a)  k
 X
j2J 00
y(j)
!
h +
X
j2J 00
y(j)j

X
a2C
f(a) + kML2h +
X
j2J 00
y(j)j

X
a2C
f(a) + ~y +
X
j2J 00
y(j)j
=
X
a2C
f(a) + y
=
X
a2C
f(a) +
X
a2B
(f(a)  e(a))
=
X
a2A
f(a) 
X
a2B
e(a)
=
X
a2A
e(a) 
X
a2B
e(a)
=
X
a2C
e(a):
Although g^ may not be exactly feasible within coalition C, coalition C can weakly improve
upon f because agents' preference relations are weakly monotone. This contradicts that
f 2 CS(E). This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Thus, we have established the proof of Lemma 1.
Next, we prove that in an economy with a large number of agents, every strong core
allocation has the weak equal treatment property. Before giving the precise statement,
we introduce some notation. Let XL; = fx 2 ZL j kxk1  g. A set XL; is dened
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as follows. A mapping  : XL; ! Z+ belongs to XL; if and only if
P
x2XL; (x)  1,P
x2XL; (x)x = 0, and there exists no mapping  : XL; ! Z+ such thatX
x2XL;
(x)  1;
X
x2XL;
(x)x = 0;
(x)  (x) for all x 2 XL;, and
(y) < (y) for some y 2 XL;:
Let
(L; ) = sup
8<: X
x2XL;
(x)
  2 XL;
9=; :
The important fact is that (L; ) is nite and, therefore, it is a natural number. This
fact is shown in Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
The rst statement of the theorem follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let A be the set of agents such that #A > r(L; ). If economy E : A ! T
satises that #At=#A  1=r for all t 2 T , then all strong core allocations for E have the
weak equal treatment property, i.e., for all f 2 CS(E), all t 2 T , and all a; b 2 At, we
have f(a) t f(b).
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an allocation f 2 CS(E), a type t 2 T ,
and two agents a; b 2 At such that f(a) t f(b). Without loss of generality, we can assume
that f(a) %t f(c) %t f(b) for all c 2 At. By Lemma 1, kf(c)k1   for all c 2 A. Since
both f(c) and e(c) are nonnegative vectors, we have kf(c)   e(c)k1  maxf; Mg = 
for all c 2 A. Thus, f(c)   e(c) 2 XL; for all c 2 A. Dene  : XL; ! Z+ by, for all
x 2 XL;,
(x) = #fc 2 A j f(c)  e(c) = xg:
Note that X
x2XL;
(x)x =
X
c2A
(f(c)  e(c)) = 0 and
X
x2XL;
(x) = #A > r(L; ):
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Thus, by the denition of (L; ), there exists a natural number ` > r and j 2 XL;
(j = 1; : : : ; `) such that for all x 2 XL;, (x) =
P`
j=1 j(x). Therefore, there exists a
partition fB1; : : : ; B`g of A such that for all j 2 f1; : : : ; `g and all x 2 XL;,
j(x) = #fc 2 Bj j f(c)  e(c) = xg:
Without loss of generality, we can assume b 2 B1. Since 1 2 XL;, we haveX
c2B1
(f(c)  e(c)) =
X
x2XL;
1(x)x = 0 and
#B1 =
X
x2XL;
1(x)  (L; ):
Note that the set At nB1 is nonempty, because #At  #A=r > (L; )  #B1.
Claim 2. f(c) t f(b) for all c 2 At nB1.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that f(c) t f(b) for some c 2 At nB1. We consider a
coalition C1 = (A n (B1 [ fcg)) [ fbg. Dene g1 : C1 ! ZL+ by
g1(c) =
8<: f(c) if c = b;f(c) if c 2 C1 n fbg:
Since
P
c2AnB1(f(c)   e(c)) = 0 and agents b and c have the same type, we haveP
c2C1(g1(c)   e(c)) = 0. In addition, we have g1(b) = f(c) t f(b). This contradicts
that f 2 CS(E). This completes the proof of Claim 2.
From Claim 2, it follows that a 2 B1. SinceAtnB1 is nonempty, we can pick c0 2 AtnB1.
We consider a coalition C2 = (B1 n fag) [ fc0g. Dene g2 : C2 ! ZL+ by
g2(c) =
8<: f(a) if c = c0;f(c) if c 2 C2 n fc0g:
Since
P
c2B1(f(c) e(c)) = 0 and agents a and c0 have the same type, we have
P
c2C2(g2(c) 
e(c)) = 0. In addition, from Claim 2, it follows that g2(c
0) = f(a) t f(b) t f(c0). This
contradicts that f 2 CS(E). This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
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We next prove the second statement of the theorem. Let
 =  + k(L  1) and
q = maxf(L; ); 2L 1LL=2L+1(1 + )g:
Note that both numbers  and q depend only on exogenous variables. Let A be the set
of agents such that #A > rq and let E : A! T be an economy such that #At=#A  1=r
for all t 2 T . We prove that CS(E)  WCM(E). (Recall that the opposite inclusion
WCM(E)  CS(E) is always satised.) Let f 2 CS(E).
Claim 3. i a f(a) for all i 2 f1; : : : ; Lg and all a 2 A.
Proof. Let i 2 f1; : : : ; Lg and a 2 A. We consider two distinct cases.
Case 1. f (j)(a) = 0 for all j 6= i.
Since -a 2 Pk, we have
f(a) a f(a) + k i =
 
f (i)(a) + k

i:
By Lemma 1, we have
f (i)(a) + k   + k < :
Since -a is weakly monotone, we have f(a) a i.
Case 2. f (j)(a)  1 for some j 6= i.
Since -a 2 Pk, we have
f(a) a f(a) 
X
j 6=i
f (j)(a)j + k
X
j 6=i
f (j)(a)i =
 
f (i)(a) + k
X
j 6=i
f (j)(a)
!
i:
By Lemma 1, we have
f (i)(a) + k
X
j 6=i
f (j)(a)   + k(L  1) = :
Since -a is weakly monotone, we have f(a) a i. This completes the proof of Claim
3.
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For every t 2 T , let
't = fz 2 ZL j z + et 2 ZL+ and z + et t f(a)g = fx 2 ZL+ j x t f(a)g   fetg
and
 t = fz 2 ZL j z + et 2 ZL+ and z + et %t f(a)g = fx 2 ZL+ jx %t f(a)g   fetg;
where a 2 At. By Lemma 2, since #A > r(L; ), 't and  t are both well-dened for all
t 2 T . For all t 2 T , dene the set '0t of minimal elements of 't as follows: z 2 '0t if and
only if z 2 't and there exists no y 2 't with y < z. The set  0t of minimal elements of
 t is dened similarly. Since every 't and every  t is bounded from below, by Gordan's
lemma (Lemma 4 in the Appendix), '0t and  
0
t are nonempty and nite, and satises that
't  '0t + ZL+ and  t   0t + ZL+. Since agents' preference relations are weakly monotone,
we have 't = '
0
t + ZL+ and  t =  0t + ZL+ for all t 2 T .
Let XL; = fx 2 ZL j kxk1  g.
Claim 4. '0t  XL; and  0t  XL; for all t 2 T .
Proof. We only prove that '0t  XL;. The inclusion  0t  XL; can be proved similarly.
Suppose, to the contrary, that '0t 6 XL; for some t 2 T . Since '0t  ZL+   fetg 
ZL+ f(M; : : : ;M)g andM < , we have, for all z 2 '0t and all h 2 f1; : : : ; Lg, z(h) >  .
Therefore, from '0t 6 XL;, there exists a z 2 '0t and an h 2 f1; : : : ; Lg such that z(h) > .
Since h t f(a) for all a 2 At by Claim 3, we have h   et 2 't. For coordinate h,
we have
z(h) >   (h)h   e(h)t :
Since z   et, for coordinate i with i 6= h, we have
z(i)   e(i)t = (i)h   e(i)t :
Thus, z > h  et and h  et 2 't. This contradicts that z 2 '0t. We have established
the proof of Claim 4.
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By Claim 4, for all t 2 T , we have
 t =  
0
t + ZL+
= ( 0t \XL;) + ZL+
 ( t \XL;) + ZL+
  t + ZL+
=  t:
Thus,  t = ( t \XL;) + ZL+ for all t 2 T . Therefore,
S
t2T  t =
 S
t2T  t \XL;

+ ZL+.
Claim 5. 0 62 int  co  St2T  t if and only if 0 62 int  co  St2T  t \XL;, where int(C)
and co(C) denote the interior and the convex hull of set C, respectively.
Proof. It suces to prove the suciency. Assume that 0 62 int  co  St2T  t \XL;. By
the separation theorem for convex sets, there exists a p 2 RL n f0g such that, for all
z 2 co  St2T  t \XL;, p  z  0.
We prove that p  0. Suppose, to the contrary, that p(h) < 0 for some h 2 f1; : : : ; Lg.
Since, by Claim 3, h t f(a) for all a 2 At and all t 2 T , and since et  0 and -t is
weakly monotone, we have
h + et %t h t f(a):
Thus, h 2 't \XL;   t \XL;. Then, by the consequence of the separation theorem
for convex sets,
0  p  (h) =  p(h);
a contradiction. We have then p  0.
Since
S
t2T  t =
 S
t2T  t \XL;

+ ZL+, we have p  z  0 for all z 2 co
 S
t2T  t

.
Hence, 0 62 int  co  St2T  t. This completes the proof of Claim 5.
We next nd a price vector p under which strong core allocation f satises both the
cost minimization and the preference maximization. To obtain such price vector p, we
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rst nd a price vector p0 under which f satises the cost minimization. Then, we move
p0 in an appropriate direction slightly and make the resulting price vector satisfy the
desired properties. The following claim will be used not only when we nd the rst price
vector p0 but also when we move p0 in an appropriate direction.
Claim 6. Let H be a linear subspace of RL. If
S
t2T 't \ XL; \ H 6= ;, then 0 62
ri
 
co
 S
t2T  t \XL; \H

, where ri(C) denotes the relative interior of set C.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that 0 2 ri  co  St2T  t \XL; \H. Let z0 2 St2T 't\
XL; \ H. Then, there exists a t0 2 T with z0 2 't0 . Since every t is irreexive,
0 62 St2T 't and, therefore, z0 6= 0. Let s = minfs 2 R j s z0 2 co  St2T  t \XL; \Hg.
Then, by Lemma 6, jsj   and there exist q0 2 Z++ with q0  2L 1LL=2L+1, fxt;j j j =
1; : : : ;mtg   t \XL; \H (t 2 T ), and ((1)t ; : : : ; (mt)t ) 2 Qmt+ (t 2 T ) such thatX
t2T
mtX
j=1

(j)
t = 1;
q0 
(j)
t 2 Z+ for all j 2 f1; : : : ;mtg and all t 2 T ;
q0 s 2  Z++; andX
t2T
mtX
j=1

(j)
t xt;j = s z0:
Since #A > rq = rmaxf(L; ); 2L 1LL=2L+1(1 + )g, we have, for all t 2 T , #At 
#A=r > 2L 1LL=2L+1(1 + ). Thus, for all t 2 T n ft0g, there exists a mutually disjoint
family fCt;j j j = 1; : : : ;mtg of subsets of At such that
#Ct;j = q0 
(j)
t for all j 2 f1; : : : ;mtg:
Since q0 + q0 s  2L 1LL=2L+1(1 + ), there exists a mutually disjoint family fCt0;j j j =
1; : : : ;mt0g [ fDg of subsets of At0 such that
#Ct0;j = q0 
(j)
t0 for all j 2 f1; : : : ;mt0g, and
#D = q0 jsj:
Let S =
S
t2T
Smt
j=1Ct;j [D. Dene g : S ! ZL+ by
g(a) =
8<: xt;j + et if a 2 Ct;j (j = 1; : : : ;mt; t 2 T );z0 + et0 if a 2 D:
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Then,
X
a2S
g(a) =
X
t2T
mtX
j=1
(#Ct;j) xt;j + (#D) z0 +
X
a2S
e(a)
= q0
 X
t2T
mtX
j=1

(j)
t xt;j + jsj z0
!
+
X
a2S
e(a)
=
X
a2S
e(a):
Therefore, g is exactly feasible within coalition S. For a 2 Ct;j (j = 1; : : : ;mt; t 2
T ), since xt;j 2  t, we have g(a) = xt;j + et %t f(a). For a 2 D, since z0 2 't0 ,
we have g(a) = zt0 + et0 t0 f(a). This contradicts that f 2 CS(E). Hence, 0 62
ri
 
co
 S
t2T  t \XL; \H

. This completes the proof of Claim 6.
By Claim 4,
S
t2T 't \XL; 6= ; and then, by Claim 6, 0 62 int
 
co
 S
t2T  t \XL;

.
Thus, by Claim 5, we have 0 62 int  co  St2T  t. By the separation theorem for convex
sets, there exists a p0 2 RL n f0g such that p0  z  0 for all z 2 co
 S
t2T  t

. From the
weak monotonicity of preference relations, co
 S
t2T  t

= co
 S
t2T  t

+ RL+. Hence, we
have p0  0.
Claim 7. p0  (f(a)  e(a)) = 0 for all a 2 A.
Proof. Since f(a)   e(a) 2 St2T  t for all a 2 A, we have p0  (f(a)   e(a))  0. By the
exact feasibility of f , we have p0  (f(a)  e(a)) = 0 for all a 2 A.
Claim 8. p0  0.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an h 2 f1; : : : ; Lg with p(h)0 = 0.
Since p0 2 RL+ n f0g, there exists a j 2 f1; : : : ; Lg with p(j)0 > 0. Since
P
a2A f
(j)(a) =P
a2A e
(j)(a) > 0, there exists an agent a 2 A with f (j)(a)  1. From -a 2 Pk, it follows
that f(a) a f(a)  j + k h. Thus,
f(a)  j + k h   e(a) 2
[
t2T
't 
[
t2T
 t:
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By the consequence of the separation theorem and by Claim 7, we have
0  p0  (f(a)  j + k h   e(a)) =  p(j)0 + k p(h)0 =  p(j)0 ;
which is a contradiction. Thus, p0  0.
Claim 9. There exists a p 2 RL++ such that
(1) p  z > 0 for all z 2 St2T 't, and
(2) p  z  0 for all z 2 St2T  t.
Proof. Let H0 = fz 2 RL j p0  z = 0g. If
S
t2T 't \H0 = ;, then p0 satises the desired
properties. Assume that
S
t2T 't \H0 6= ;.
Subclaim 9.1.
S
t2T  t \H0  XL;.
Proof. Let z 2 St2T  t \H0. Then, p0  z = 0. Since p0  0 by Claim 8 and p0  y  0 for
all y 2 co  St2T  t, we have, by Claim 4, z 2 St2T  0t  XL;.
By Subclaim 9.1, we have
; 6=
[
t2T
't \H0 
[
t2T
 t \H0  XL;:
Thus,
S
t2T 't \XL; \H0 6= ; and, by Claim 6, we have
0 62 ri
 
co
 [
t2T
 t \XL; \H0
!!
= ri
 
co
 [
t2T
 t \H0
!!
:
By the separation theorem for convex sets, there exists a p1 2 span
 S
t2T  t \H0
 n f0g
such that p1  z  0 for all z 2
S
t2T  t \H0. Let
E0 =
[
t2T
 t nH0 =
(
z 2
[
t2T
 t
 p0  z > 0
)
:
Let E 00 be the set of minimal elements of E0, i.e., x 2 E 00 if and only if x 2 E0 and there
exists no y 2 E0 with y < x. Since E0 is nonempty and bounded from below, by Gordan's
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lemma (Lemma 4 in the Appendix), E 00 is a nonempty nite subset of E0 and satises
that E0  E 00 + ZL+. Since p0  0, we have
0 < minfp0  z j z 2 E 00g = inffp0  z j z 2 E0g:
Since the mapping p 7! minfpz j z 2 E 00g is continuous, there exists an open neighborhood
U0 of p0 such that, for all p 2 U0, minfp  z j z 2 E 00g > 0. Since p0  0, by taking a
suciently small "1 > 0, we have p0 + "1 p1  0 and p0 + "1 p1 2 U0. Then,
0 < minf(p0 + "1 p1)  z j z 2 E 00g = inff(p0 + "1 p1)  z j z 2 E0g:
Summing up, we have obtained that
(a) p0 + "1 p1 2 RL++;
(b) (p0 + "1 p1)  z > 0 for all z 2
S
t2T  t nH0; and
(c) (p0 + "1 p1)  z  0 for all z 2
S
t2T  t \H0.
Let H1 = fz 2 RL j (p0 + "1 p1)  z = 0g. If
S
t2T 't \ H0 \ H1 = ;, then p0 + "1 p1
satises the desired properties. Assume that
S
t2T 't \H0 \H1 6= ;. Then, by the same
argument as above, there exists a p2 2 span
 S
t2T  t \H0 \H1
nf0g and an "2 > 0 such
that
(a0) p0 + "1 p1 + "2 p2 2 RL++;
(b0) (p0 + "1 p1 + "2 p2)  z > 0 for all z 2
S
t2T  t n (H0 [H1); and
(c0) (p0 + "1 p1 + "2 p2)  z  0 for all z 2
S
t2T  t \H0 \H1.
Let H2 = fz 2 RL j (p0 + "1 p1 + "2 p2)  z = 0g. If
S
t2T 't \H0 \H1 \H2 = ;, then
p0 + "1 p1 + "2 p2 satises the desired properties. If
S
t2T 't \H0 \H1 \H2 6= ;, then, by
repeating the same argument, say, m times (m  L), we could obtain that[
t2T
't \H0 \H1 \    \Hm 1 = ;;
because 0 62 St2T 't and
dim (H0 \H1 \H2) < dim (H0 \H1) < dimH0 = L  1:
The vector p0 +
Pm 1
i=1 "i pi satises the desired properties. This completes the proof of
Claim 9.
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Let p be the vector obtained in Claim 9. Let
F =
(
z 2
[
t2T
 t
 p  z > 0
)
and V =
(
z 2
[
t2T
 t
 p  z = 0
)
:
Since f(a)   e(a) 2 St2T  t for all a 2 A, we have, by Claim 9, p  (f(a)   e(a))  0 for
all a 2 A. By the exact feasibility of f , we have
p  (f(a)  e(a)) = 0 for all a 2 A
and, therefore, f(a)   e(a) 2 V for all a 2 A. Thus, by Claim 9, the pair (p; f) satises
conditions (i)-(iii) of the denition of cost-minimized Walras equilibrium, but p may not
be a rational vector. Finally, we nd an integral price vector p under which f is a
cost-minimized Walras allocation. Note that co(F ) \ V = ;. Since p  0, we have
co(F +ZL+)\ V = ; and, then, co(F )\ (V  RL+) = ;. By Inoue's [9] separation theorem
(Lemma 6 in the Appendix), there exists a p 2 V ?\ZL+ and an " > 0 such that p z  "
for all z 2 F . We prove that (p; f) is a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium. Since p 2 V ?
and f(a)  e(a) 2 V for all a 2 A, we have
p  (f(a)  e(a)) = 0 for all a 2 A:
Let a 2 A and x 2 ZL+ with x a f(a). Then, x   e(a) 2
S
t2T 't  F . Thus,
p  (x  e(a))  " > 0.
Let a 2 A and x 2 ZL+ with x %a f(a). Then, x   e(a) 2
S
t2T  t  F [ V . Thus,
p  (x   e(a))  0. Therefore, (p; f) is a cost-minimized Walras equilibrium. We have
established that CS(E)  WCM(E).
Appendix
The following results are used in the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 3. Let L and N be natural numbers. Let XL;N = fx 2 ZL j kxk1  Ng. De-
ne a set XL;N as follows: A mapping  : XL;N ! Z+ belongs to XL;N if and only ifP
x2XL;N (x)  1,
P
x2XL;N (x)x = 0, and there exists no mapping  : XL;N ! Z+ such
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that
P
x2XL;N (x)  1,
P
x2XL;N (x)x = 0, (x)  (x) for all x 2 XL;N , and (y) <
(y) for some y 2 XL;N . Then, the number
(L;N) := sup
8<: X
x2XL;N
(x)
  2 XL;N
9=;
is nite. Hence, (L;N) can be achieved by some  2 XL;N . In particular,
(1; 1) = 2;
(1; N)  N2(N + 1)=2 for all N  2; and
(L+ 1; N)  (L;N)(1; N(N + 1)(L;N)) for all L;N 2 Z++:
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on L. Let L = 1. Clearly, (1; 1) = 2. We
consider the case where N  2.
Claim 10. (1; N)  N2(N + 1)=2 for all N  2.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a mapping  2 X1;N such that
P
x2X1;N (x) >
N2(N + 1)=2. Because
P
x2X1;N (x) > 2, by the denition of X1;L, (0) = 0 and there
exists no ` 2 X1;N n f0g such that (`)  1 and ( `)  1. Thus, #fx 2 X1;N j(x) 
1g  N . SincePx2X1;N (x) > N2(N +1)=2, there exists an integer m 2 X1;N n f0g such
that
(m) > N(N + 1)=2:
We may assume that m  1.
Subclaim 10.1. If ` 2 Z and 1  `  N , then ( `) < m.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an ` 2 Z such that 1  `  N and
( `)  m. Note that (m) > N(N+1)=2 > N  `. We dene a mapping  : X1;N ! Z+
by
(x) =
8>>><>>>:
m if x =  `;
` if x = m;
0 otherwise:
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Clearly, X
x2X1;N
(x)  1;
(x)  (x) for all x 2 X1;N , and
(m) < (m):
Moreover, we have
P
x2X1;N (x)x = m( `) + `m = 0. This contradicts that  2 X1;N .
Therefore, we have established the proof of Subclaim 10.1.
Since
0 =
X
x2X1;N
(x)x =
NX
`=1
(`)`+
NX
`=1
( `)( `);
we have
PN
`=1 ( `)` =
PN
`=1 (`)`. On the other hand, from Subclaim 10.1, it follows
that
NX
`=1
( `)` < m
NX
`=1
`
= mN(N + 1)=2
< (m)m

NX
`=1
(`)`;
which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of Claim 10.
Let K 2 Z++. Assume that for all N 2 Z++ and all L 2 Z++ with L  K, (L;N) is
nite. We now prove that (K + 1; N) is nite for all N 2 Z++.
Claim 11. (K + 1; N)  (K;N)(1; N(N + 1)(K;N)) for all N 2 Z++.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that (K + 1; N) > (K;N)(1; N(N + 1)(K;N)) for
some N 2 Z++. Then, there exists a mapping  2 XK+1;N such thatX
x2XK+1;N
(x) > (K;N)(1; N(N + 1)(K;N)):
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We dene a mapping  : XK;N ! Z+ by (y) =
P
`2X1;N (`; y) for all y 2 XK;N . From
 2 XK+1;N , it follows thatX
y2XK;N
(y)y =
X
y2XK;N
X
`2X1;N
(`; y)y = 0:
We also have X
y2XK;N
(y) =
X
y2XK;N
X
`2X1;N
(`; y)
=
X
x2XK+1;N
(x)
> (K;N)(1; N(N + 1)(K;N)):
Thus, there exists a natural number k > (1; N(N + 1)(K;N)) and mappings ~j 2
XK;N (j = 1; : : : ; k) such that, for all y 2 XK;N ,
Pk
j=1 ~j(y) = (y). Since
Pk
j=1 ~j(y) =P
`2X1;N (`; y) for all y 2 XK;N , there exist mappings j : XK+1;N ! Z+ (j = 1; : : : ; k)
such that X
`2X1;N
j(`; y) = ~j(y) for all y 2 XK;N and all j 2 f1; : : : ; kg and
kX
j=1
j(`; y) = (`; y) for all (`; y) 2 XK+1;N :
For every j 2 f1; : : : ; kg, let
j =
X
`2X1;N
X
y2XK;N
j(`; y)` 2 Z:
Since  2 XK+1;N , we have
kX
j=1
j =
X
`2X1;N
X
y2XK;N
kX
j=1
j(`; y)` =
X
`2X1;N
X
y2XK;N
(`; y)` = 0:
Since ~j 2 XK;N , it follows that for all ` 2 X1;N ,X
y2XK;N
j(`; y) 
X
y2XK;N
~j(y)  (K;N):
Therefore, for all j 2 f1; : : : ; kg,
jjj 
X
`2X1;N
j`j(K;N) = N(N + 1)(K;N):
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Thus, j 2 X1;N(N+1)(K;N) for all j 2 f1; : : : ; kg. Since
Pk
j=1 j = 0 and k > (1; N(N +
1)(K;N)), there exists a subset J of f1; : : : ; kg such that ; 6= J ( f1; : : : ; kg andP
j2J j = 0. Dene a mapping  : XK+1;N ! Z+ by, for all x 2 XK+1;N ,
(x) =
X
j2J
j(x):
We have X
x2XK+1;N
(x)x(1) =
X
`2X1;N
X
y2XK;N
X
j2J
j(`; y)`
=
X
j2J
j
= 0:
Since ~j 2 XK;N for all j, we haveX
(`;y)2XK+1;N
(`; y)y =
X
y2XK;N
X
`2X1;N
(`; y)y
=
X
j2J
X
y2XK;N
X
`2X1;N
j(`; y)y
=
X
j2J
X
y2XK;N
~j(y)y
= 0:
Thus,
P
x2XK+1;N (x)x = 0. Since J 6= ;, we have
P
x2XK+1;N (x)  1. It is obvious that
for all x 2 XK+1;N ,
(x) =
X
j2J
j(x) 
kX
j=1
j(x) = (x):
Since J ( f1; : : : ; kg and Px2XK+1;N j(x)  1 for all j 2 f1; : : : ; kg, there exists an
element x of XK+1;N such that
(x) =
X
j2J
j(x
) <
kX
j=1
j(x
) = (x):
This contradicts that  2 XK+1;N . This completes the proof of Claim 11.
Hence, we have established the proof of Lemma 3.
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Lemma 4 (Gordan's lemma). Let E be a nonempty subset of ZL. Dene a subset E 0
of E as follows: x 2 E 0 if and only if x 2 E and there exists no y 2 E with y < x. If E
is bounded from below, then E 0 is a nonempty nite set and satises that E  E 0 + ZL+.
Proof. See, e.g., Inoue [9, Lemma 5.1].
Lemma 5 (Hadamard's inequality). If B = (b1; : : : ; b`) is an `  ` matrix of real
numbers, then
jdetBj 
Y`
j=1
kbjk;
where detB is the determinant of matrix B and k  k is the Euclidean norm.
Proof. See Dunford and Schwartz [6, pp.1018-1019].
Lemma 6. Let E  XL;N , z 2 E n f0g, and 0 2 ri (co(E)), where ri(C) denotes the
relative interior of set C. Let m = dim span(E), s = minfs 2 R j s z 2 co(E)g, and
q = 2m 1mm=2Nm+1. Then, 1  m  L, jsj  N , and there exist q0 2 Z++ with q0  q,
fx1; : : : ; xmg  E, and ((1); : : : ; (m)) 2 Qm+ such that
mX
j=1
(j) = 1;
q0 
(j) 2 Z+ for all j 2 f1; : : : ;mg;
q0 s 2  Z++; and
mX
j=1
(j)xj = s z
:
Proof. From E  XL;N and z 2 Enf0g, it follows that 1  m  L. Since E is a nonempty
nite set, co(E) is compact. Since z 6= 0, s is well-dened and, from 0 2 ri (co(E)), s < 0.
In addition, from s z 2 co(E)  co(XL;N) and z 6= 0, it follows that jsj  N=kzk1  N .
Since s z lies on the relative boundary of polytope co(E), there exists a (m   1)-
dimensional facet F of co(E) such that s z 2 F . Hence, there exist anely independent
vectors fx1; : : : ; xmg  E such that s z 2 cofx1; : : : ; xmg  F .
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Claim 12. fx1   xm; : : : ; xm 1   xm; zg is linearly independent.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that fx1 xm; : : : ; xm 1 xm; zg is linearly dependent.
Since fx1  xm; : : : ; xm 1  xmg is linearly independent (because fx1; : : : ; xmg is anely
independent), there exists a ((1); : : : ; (m 1)) 2 Rm 1 n f0g such that
z =
m 1X
j=1
(j)(xj   xm):
Let p 2 span(E) n f0g be a normal vector to facet F such that
p  x  p  (s z) for all x 2 co(E):
Then, for all j 2 f1; : : : ;m  1g, p  (xj   xm) = 0 and, therefore, we have
p  z =
m 1X
j=1
(j) p  (xj   xm) = 0:
Hence, p  x  p  (s z) = 0 for all x 2 co(E). This contradicts that 0 2 ri (co(E)). We
have established the proof of Claim 12.
We may assume that fx1   xm; : : : ; xm 1   xm; z; m+1; : : : ; Lg is a basis of RL.
For every j 2 f1; : : : ; Lg, let x^j = (x(1)j ; : : : ; x(m)j )T 2 Zm, where the symbol T is the
transposition operator of vectors. Also, let z^ = (z(1); : : : ; z(m))T 2 Zm. Since s z 2
cofx1; : : : ; xmg, there exists ((1); : : : ; (m)) 2 Rm+ such that
mX
j=1
(j) = 1 and
s z =
mX
j=1
(j) xj =
m 1X
j=1
(j) (xj   xm) + xm:
Let B = (x^1   x^m; : : : ; x^m 1   x^m; z^). Then, B is a nonsingular mm matrix. Since
B
0BBBBBB@
(1)
...
(m 1)
 s
1CCCCCCA =  x^m;
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by Cramer's rule, we have
(j) =
detBj
detB
for all j 2 f1; : : : ;m  1g;
where
Bj = (x^1   x^m; : : : ; x^j 1   x^m; x^m; x^j+1   x^m; : : : ; x^m 1   x^m; z^):
Since all elements in matrices B and Bj (j = 1; : : : ;m  1) are integral, we have
j detBj 2 Z++ and
j detBj(j) = j detBjj 2 Z+ for all j 2 f1; : : : ;m  1g:
Hence,
j detBj(m) = j detBj  
m 1X
j=1
j detBj(j) 2 Z+:
In addition, by Hadamard's inequality (Lemma 5), we have
j detBj 
m 1Y
j=1
kx^j   x^mk  kz^k  mm=2(2N)m 1N = 2m 1mm=2Nm:
Although j detBj s may not be integral, from j detBj s z =Pmj=1 j detBj(j) xj 2 ZL, it
follows that j detBj s kzk1 2 Z. Let q0 = j detBj kzk1 2 Z++. Since z 2 XL;N , we
have
q0  2m 1mm=2Nm N = q:
Summing up, we have
q0 2 Z++ with q0  q;
fx1; : : : ; xmg  E;
((1); : : : ; (m)) 2 Qm+ ;
mX
j=1
(j) = 1;
q0 
(j) 2 Z+ for all j 2 f1; : : : ;mg;
q0 s 2  Z++; and
mX
j=1
(j) xj = s z
:
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
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Lemma 7 (Inoue's [9] separation theorem). Let F be a nonempty subset of ZL and
let V be a linear subspace of RL spanned by some elements of ZL. If F is bounded from
below and if co(F ) \ (V   RL+) = ;, then there exists a p 2 V ? \ ZL+ and an " > 0 such
that
p  z  " for all z 2 co(F );
where V ? is the orthogonal complement of V .
Proof. See Inoue [9, Theorem 5.2].
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